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PANEL I
AGENCY AUTONOMY AND THE
UNITARY EXECUTIVE
STEPHEN BREYER*
As moderator of this distinguished panel, I shall try to set the scene. I
shall argue that we must separate two important issues: the first, "sepa-
ration of powers," raises issues of constitutional law; and the second,
"Presidential control of agency decision making," raises issues of fair and
effective government. In discussing each, I shall raise a few points
designed to lead you to conclude that the two sets of issues do not have
much to do with each other, that the second set of issues is far more
important than the first, and that at the heart of the second set lies the
question of governmental "coordination" of both substantive policy and
relevant law. Whether I succeed or not, we shall then go on to hear from
Judge Silberman, a judicial expert on separation of powers, from Profes-
sor Elliot, who, as General Counsel of EPA, can examine the coordina-
tion problem from an agency's point of view, and Mr. Eastland, a former
high Justice Department official, familiar with its perspectives, problems
and needs.
The classical "separation of powers" question, at its heart, is different
from the "coordination" question the government now faces, for two ba-
sic reasons. First, the basic functional problem that underlies the doc-
trine is itself only distantly related to the legal doctrines that have arisen
to deal with that problem. To understand that basic problem consider
the example of Damien, the attempted assassin of Louis XV. Damien's
sentence was torture, being dragged through the streets tied to four hor-
ses and torn to bits. The important point (along with Damien's last
words on the morning of his execution, perhaps the all time classical
understatement, "It's going to be a rough day"), as Michel Foucoult ar-
gues, is this: the reason for the terrible punishment is that the King him-
self embodied all law; thus, any violation of the law amounted to an
attack on the King. A violation that consisted of an actual attack on the
King himself, was that much more terrible, and therefore, obviously de-
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
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serving of the worst possible punishment. Punishment as personal re-
venge, the law as embodied in an individual, and the refusal to separate
the person from the state can produce such arbitrary, unfair behavior
that it is hardly surprising that the eighteenth century saw a need to
separate firmly the author of the law from its enforcer. This problem,
however, calls for a basic, not a perfect, separation between legislature
and executive; and it does not necessarily require separation of the judici-
ary. Indeed, Montesquieu's "three" branches of government consisted of
legislative, executive, and foreign affairs.
Second, the American Constitution's separation of branches is more
rigid, more extensive, and more thorough than Montesquieu might have
thought appropriate. Even so, I do not believe it should act as a serious
constraint upon our ability to solve problems of government, nor to
achieve necessary coordination among governmental departments. As
one examines both past and more recent separation-of-powers cases, it
seems as if the courts will grant Congress considerable leeway to create
new kinds of institutions to solve particular governmental problems (e.g.,
the special prosecutor, the sentencing commission). It is not surprising
that the Supreme Court has tended to uphold their constitutionality, for
typically their creation does not threaten a constitutionally protected
human right, nor does it call upon the Court to umpire a dispute between
the other branches (for both Congress and the President agreed to the
institution-creating legislation). Indeed, the cases, with one exception,
suggest that the Court will uphold legislation delegating power to a
branch provided: 1) the power is at least arguably related to the basic
function of that branch; 1 2) the specific text of the Constitution does not
specifically forbid the delegation; 2 and 3) the delegation of the power to
one branch does not unreasonably interfere with the ability of a different
branch to carry out its constitutionally mandated duties.3
These principles would not seem unduly restrictive. And, if one is pre-
pared to overlook some of the analysis (say, by reading Humphrey's Ex-
ecutor4 as being not about a "headless fourth branch of government," but
about "executive branch agencies come in many different shapes and
sizes"), and assume that Mistretta5 (the sentencing commission case)
1. See Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec., 281 U.S. 464 (1930).
2. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
3. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
4. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
5. United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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more than Bowsher6 (the Gramm-Rudman case) represents the future,
there is not much reason to think the Court either has departed radically
from those principles, or will do so.
To understand the basic governmental problem at issue, one should
pose the famous question "quis ipsos custodiate?" and examine it in light
of the regulatory problems of the 1970's. Who will control the regula-
tors, particularly if those regulators are "out of control?" And, who will
provide proper coordination among programs; who will see that those
who enforce individual regulatory programs make decisions that not only
are sensible in themselves, but that also make sense when viewed in the
context of a total package of related regulatory decisions?
In our tripartite system of government, we have tended to form our
answers in terms of "the Congress, the Courts, and the President." Con-
gress' immediate answer was the "legislative veto," which it intended to
apply to individual regulatory decisions of which some significant por-
tion of its members disapproved. But Chadha,7 for one thing, has made
it difficult to continue down that path. The degree to which the courts
are institutionally capable of holding regulators in check-particularly
where the issue is unwise policy-is highly debatable, and I shall not
engage in that debate here. But what about the President? Why can he
not control the policies of the broadly defined "executive" agencies?
That the President might find such control difficult comes as a surprise
to Europeans used to cabinet government; yet surprisingly difficult it is.
For one thing, most statutes that create regulatory programs delegate the
power to write rules, to adjudicate, to create administratively and to en-
force those programs, not to the "President," but rather to the "Admin-
istrator," to the "Secretary," to the "Board," and to the "Agency." The
President does not have the legal right to make individual program-re-
lated decisions.
For another thing, the President does not necessarily find it easy sim-
ply to order a subordinate to make a particular decision on pain of dis-
missal. To dismiss a subordinate-indeed, for the President to intervene
himself in a decision the statute entrusts to another-can impose a con-
siderable political cost, the size of which depends upon the official, the
relevant interest groups, the decision, and the circumstances. To under-
stand the problem, simply consider how rarely one sees dismissals; and
6. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
7. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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consider as well how rarely the President will personally intervene in a
regulatory matter.
Finally, a host of individual laws, sometimes limiting the President's
power to dismiss, sometimes simply setting procedural rules for interven-
tion, may inhibit his ability to control-or even to explore some of the
considerations underlying-the individual regulatory decision.
Given the need for policy coordination, a need that increases substan-
tially with the growth of regulation, every President since President Ford
has tried to increase the power of the White House, or the Office of Man-
agement and Budget, to carry out and to oversee significant, detailed reg-
ulatory decisions. Thus, we have seen a Council on Wage and Price
Stability gradually evolve into an OMB Office of Information and Regu-
latory Affairs (OIRA). We have seen executive orders (often exempting
"independent" "agencies) that require presentation of "regulatory agen-
das" to OMB and insist upon advance OMB review of significant regula-
tory decisions.
The extent to which this centralizing of regulatory power has
worked-has led to better substantive regulatory policy making-by now
ought to be the subject of evaluation. On the one hand, OIRA, or any
similar OMB group, operates within formidable institutional constraints.
Does it have the expertise necessary to determine whether or not a pro-
posed agency rule is desirable? Is its staff of forty-mostly policy ana-
lysts-sufficiently large to supervise with understanding a regulatory
bureaucracy of tens of thousands? Does it have the necessary authority
to convince those agencies to do what it considers right? After all, the
legal power to decide likely rests within the agency; and the President
himself might not take the personal time needed to overcome high level
opposition within the agency or department. Will the agency properly
inform OIRA about its important decisions or will it use less visible deci-
sions, unspoken policies, to achieve in practice that which it fears OIRA
may disapprove?
On the other hand, OIRA and its predecessors have reported consider-
able success. If so, to what extent are such successes a function of time-
limited political considerations and to what extent a result of the institu-
tion itself? To what extent is there agreement that the substantive results
reflect "better" substantive policy?
The present institutional arrangement is difficult to evaluate because of
1) the inevitable tendency to confuse substantive results with which one
agrees or disagrees with the merits of the structural, or procedural, ar-
[Vol. 68:495
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rangements that led to those substantive results, and 2) the uncertain
extent to which political considerations may influence results at both the
"White House" and the individual "agency" levels. Yet, it is difficult for
me to see how anyone could still believe that agencies will inevitably
reach "correct" regulatory decisions on "technical, non-political"
grounds, or for other reasons, deny that considerable coordination from
the executive center is desirable. Thus, evaluation-to see whether the
present arrangements are sufficient, whether they should be modified-is
important. And, luckily for us, Don Elliot may help us in this respect.
Before closing, let me briefly mention one other related matter that I
hope we shall have a chance to discuss. It concerns legal matters. To
what extent does the Department of Justice have adequate authority to
coordinate the legal positions that executive branch entities place before
the courts? OIRA, as I have mentioned, consists of a group of policy
analysts, not lawyers. They seek to coordinate and to review substantive
policy, not legal interpretations. The Department of Justice, in principle,
has authority to approve, and thereby to coordinate, legal positions taken
by various government departments and agencies in court, but this prin-
ciple is sometimes denied by statute in practice. The result, doubly sur-
prising to foreign observers, that the government may take conflicting
positions in different courts, or that it may become wedded to positions
that are sensible when seen from the perspective of a particular agency
tied to enforcing a particular regulatory program, but not sensible when
seen from the government's center, is particularly problematic in the
post-Chevron 8 era, when the courts must pay particular attention to the
views of an agency about the meaning of the law. Is the degree of coordi-
nation insufficient? too constricting? about right?
To reiterate, I have tried to raise three sets of questions: 1) To what
extent is the current "separation of powers" doctrine an obstacle to effec-
tive government?; 2) How can the President achieve coordinated, effec-
tive implementation of programs in the executive branch of government?;
and 3) How can the President effectively coordinate legal policy, affecting
those programs?
To try to dramatize these issues, one might ask: an authoritarian Pres-
ident or balkanized Agencies? Too much centralized power or teetering
on the brink of anarchy?
I hope this introduction will stimulate discussion.
8. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1987).
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LAURENCE SILBERMAN*
Asking me to speak on the doctrine of the unitary executive is very
much like asking General George Pickett to speak on the future of the
Confederacy after the Battle of Gettysburg. For just as historians love to
point to Pickett's Charge as the high water mark of the South's effort to
secede, some legal scholars have labeled my opinion, in which my col-
league Steve Williams joined and collaborated, as the brief apogee of a
constitutional lost cause. As I listen to Steve, it sounds very lost indeed.
Our decision and, even more, Justice Scalia's dissent, issued when the
circus arrived in the big tent, are described in much of the literature as
extreme examples of a formalist approach to separation of powers juris-
prudence. It was not until I was a judge for some time, having lost track
of the dominant currents in American law schools, that I realized that
formalism was a pejorative. It never occurred to me that "strict adher-
ence to prescribed forms," which is how the dictionary defines formal-
ism, was a bad characteristic for a judge or lawyer.
Certainly such an approach to the first amendment is not similarly
denigrated. But labels notwithstanding, I have the impression that views
on separation of powers, particularly the concept of the unitary execu-
tive, are not uninfluenced by contemporary political trends. Of course,
there are exceptions, but many of those who are most hostile to a Presi-
dential claim to exercise all executive power are similarly hostile to the
politics of the majority of recent Presidents. Of course, the opposite may
also be true, and where you stand may depend on where you sit or have
sat. I have often wondered if m; own views would have been different
had I served, as did several of my colleagues, in the legislative branch,
particularly during a period when the President was of another party.
Of one thing, however, I am sure: had the issue presented in Morrison
v. Olson 9 been presented at a different time in a different context, the
prevailing academic reaction also would have been entirely different.
Suppose that another kind of independent counsel law-call it the Loy-
alty in Government Act-had been passed during the Truman Adminis-
tration by the 80th Congress, perhaps, like the Taft-Hartley Act, over the
President's veto. And further suppose the Act had been a product of
congressional concern, which as you will recall did exist, that the Tru-
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
9. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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man Administration was insufficiently zealous in rooting out communists
or communist sympathizers in senior executive positions. It might well
have been said, fairly or unfairly, that the Administration had a conflict
of interest in investigating and prosecuting such individuals because of
the political embarrassment that exposure would bring. I can easily visu-
alize, as I am sure you can, the senator from Wisconsin, or perhaps from
California, introducing such legislation in a fiery floor speech, promising
an end to the Administration's coddling of communists. And it takes
little further imagination to picture an independent counsel prosecuting
an Alger Hiss or Harry Dexter White under such a statute, and the con-
stitutional questions subsequently presented in Morrison v. Olson '0 being
raised at that earlier time. Is there a single person in this entire room
who has any doubt, any doubt at all, where that day's "Tribes" and
"Triblets" would have been found in such a controversy? Surely on the
side of the unitary executive. I have on occasion very much regretted
that we did not experience that exact scenario, because I am convinced
the Supreme Court at that time and in that context, would have held the
statute unconstitutional. I see Ted Olson watching me very carefully.
And I am sorry, Ted, that did not happen.
I do not mean to suggest the Supreme Court's opinion in Morrison v.
Olson was dictated by political considerations, although the aftermath of
Watergate and the difficulties of the Attorney General at the time of the
litigation did not help the cause of the unitary executive. No, I think in
explaining the Court's opinion, and thereby determining what is left of
the doctrine of the unitary executive, one must focus on another factor
entirely: the Court's willingness to countenance efforts to split the uni-
tary executive so long as the judiciary remains the final arbiter of intra-
executive battles-so long as the judiciary, in a sense, benefits from the
damage done to the Presidency.
At the time the Morrison case came to court, the Supreme Court had
issued a series of opinions through the seventies and the eighties that
seemed to bolster the Presidency against direct congressional encroach-
ment: Buckley,II holding that Congress could not appoint officers of the
United States; Chadha,'2 determining that Congress could not circum-
vent the President's constitutional power to shape legislation through the
10. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
11. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
12. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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legislative veto; and Bowsher, I3 holding that Congress could not maintain
theoretical authority to remove officers who perform an executive func-
tion. I believe it is not coincidental, however, that the schemes reviewed
in these cases shared another characteristic: they did not delegate to the
judiciary the application of the check on the executive. In retrospect,
that may be the real consideration underlying the Court's ostensibly vigi-
lant protection of the Presidency in those circumstances.
After all, the Court has for a long time looked more favorably upon
various devices that fracture the President's authority so long as the fed-
eral judiciary remains the coordinator of that split authority; or to put it
another way, perhaps an unkind way, so long as the federal judiciary is
the ultimate beneficiary of the power of coordination which the President
lost. That is not to accuse the Court so much of conscious self-seeking;
rather, it is to point out that men and institutions are rarely inclined to
question their own wise exercise of power.
Although in Humphrey's Executor,14 the Court justified allowing Con-
gress to place a good-cause restriction on the removal of an FTC com-
missioner, notwithstanding Myers,15 on grounds-recently discarded in
Morrison 60--that the FTC was a quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
body, not a pure executive agency; it should not be forgotten that what
constitutes just cause for removal is a question that the Court ultimately
controls. Similarly, the Court in United States v. ICC 11 permitted a law-
suit between the Justice Department and an independent regulatory
agency, notwithstanding a claim of non-justiciability-surely it was in
part because the Court stood ready then, as it does now, to resolve dis-
putes between portions of the executive branch that end up in court.
We saw the Court permit litigation between two undeniable parts of
the executive branch for the first time, and in my view ominously, in
United States v Nixon.18 The Court recognized the standing of a prosecu-
tor appointed by the Attorney General to sue the President. While
Nixon surely foreshadowed the demise of the unitary executive, at least
the Court advanced a shred of justification in a footnote: the Attorney
General, an agent of the President, issued a regulation erecting a barrier
13. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
14. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
15. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
16. 487 U.S. at 890-91.
17. 337 U.S. 426 (1948).
18. 418 U.S. 683 (1973).
[Vol. 68:495
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to the President's removing the special prosecutor. Of course, the regula-
tion actually represented a congressional slicing of executive power, since
it was issued as a condition of the Attorney General's confirmation by
the Senate. The Court later in the opinion candidly admitted that the
obvious encroachment on the President's authority over the executive
branch was necessary because the judiciary needed the evidence to carry
out its constitutional function "to do justice in criminal prosecutions." 19
Now, after Morrison, there appears to be no principle that protects the
President's authority to control his own branch against either overt or
covert congressional invasions, so long as Congress is wise enough osten-
sibly to divert the lost power to the judiciary, rather than to itself. As
Justice Scalia put it, the Court's message seems to be: "Trust us. We
[the judiciary] will make sure that [the President is] able to accomplish
[his] constitutional role."20
Of course, the two key aspects of Presidential authority over executive
branch personnel are appointment and removal. I regard removal as
more important than my colleague here. The majority in Morrison
thought it not constitutionally incongruous for a court to be given the
power to appoint those who prosecute criminal cases before it-notwith-
standing our constitutional tradition of separating the prosecutor and
judge-because of the judiciary's familiarity with the criminal process.21
But in a footnote, the Court suggested that the judiciary would have "no
special knowledge or expertise" justifying the power to appoint "officials
in the Department of Agriculture or the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission."22 Frankly, I cannot understand why we would be thought
more expert in criminal cases than FERC cases. We probably get more
of the latter than the former. Still, I suppose the Court wished to caution
Congress not to assume that the authority to appoint prosecutors would
extend necessarily to authority to appoint officials responsible for litigat-
ing civil programs even though, in my view, the incongruity is greater in
the criminal field because of a factor which Judge Breyer did not men-
tion-the impact on the individual.
As for restrictions on the President's removal power, it is simply im-
possible to glean any indication, let alone principle, out of Morrison that
even suggests the boundaries of statutory limitations on the President's
19. 418 U.S. at 707.
20. 487 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21. 487 U.S. at 676.
22. Id. at 676 n.13.
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authority to remove executive branch officials. It can no longer rest, as I
thought when I wrote our opinion, on the division between those who
exercise policy responsibility and those who do not. I do not think it can
be seriously questioned that independent counsel has and uses enormous
policy discretion. My guess is that removal restrictions are now more
defensible when they relate to officials subject to significant judicial over-
sight, those whose function is primarily litigation. Perhaps it was not so
farfetched when counsel for the House of Representatives argued in Mor-
rison that Congress could limit the President's authority over the Solici-
tor General, so long as the effectuating power to do so was transferred to
the judiciary.23
In my view, Public Citizen v. Department of Justice24 made clear that
one should always look carefully to discover the judiciary's real interest
in separation of powers cases. There, three members of the Court, in-
cluding two from the majority in Morrison, explicitly determined that the
Advisory Committee Act was unconstitutional as applied to the ABA
Judicial Selection Committee because it interfered with the exercise of
the President's appointment power. (To avoid the constitutional issue
the majority imaginatively interpreted the statute as not applying to the
ABA.) Morrison's balancing test was eschewed ostensibly because the
President's appointment power over judges is textually explicit, whereas
authority over removal of executive branch officers is implied. But that
rationale seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recognition in
Bowsher that to control subordinates, the authority to fire is even more
important than the authority to hire.25 Be that as it may, as all the world
knows, the ABA's Advisory Committee has become more of a check on
the President's appointment power than an enhancement. It is a check
that is wielded too often behind the scenes by members of the judiciary
itself.
It is often said that Morrison v. Olson, like United States v. Nixon,
stands for the proposition that in our democracy no person-even the
President-is above the law. But it is the judges who apply-and some-
times, as in the Supreme Court, make-the law. Therefore, when consid-
ering how strong the concept of the unitary executive remains in
separation-of-powers jurisprudence, one should bear in mind that it has,
23. See id. at 694-95.
24. 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989).
25. 478 U.S. at 3188-3191.
[Vol. 68:495
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and probably always will, give way to another notion which I cautioned
against in my Morrison opinion: judiciary ziber alles.
E. DONALD ELLIOTI*
I normally begin these talks by saying, it is nice to be back in front of a
relatively friendly academic audience. I feel a little bit like when I was
selected for my track team in high school and the coach said, "You're on
the javelin team. Get out and receive." When Judge Silberman advised
me at lunch that the recent symposium on the separation of powers at
George Washington University26 basically consisted of a bunch of sec-
ond-rate articles, including mine, I began to wonder whether or not that
was actually correct.
I would like to talk a little bit about the notion of formalism-formal-
ism being a dirty word. I am not against formalism or literalism in con-
stitutional adjudication; I think it has a very important role. What has
concerned me is the way in which some of the techniques of literal inter-
pretation that dominate, and properly dominate, our constitutional adju-
dication have also come to dominate much of our public dialogue about
these issues to the extent, I think, of impoverishing some of our ability to
think about these issues. I intend today to talk about the unitary execu-
tive, but not simply from the standpoint of constitutional law. I would
like to pick up on Steve Breyer's point and also consider the wisdom and
the policy advantages. The basic notion is that the unitary executive the-
ory is not only a good thing because it is required by the Constitution,
but also because you can defend it on the ground that it results in better
decisions.
Now, going back to the first point for a minute. Not too long ago
when I was at the White House for my briefing for new Presidential ap-
pointees, Roger Porter was telling a story about a flight back from St.
Louis with the President. He and the President were alone together for a
period of time, and they got into a deep discussion. Roger, a very, very
bright guy, said he thought it was a very provocative discussion on the
question of why it was that the framers of the United States Constitution
were so wise; how this group of 400,000 people living on the eastern
* Professor, Yale Law School and General Counsel of the Environmental Protection Agency.
26. See Symposium-Separation of Powers and the Executive Branch: The Reagan Era in Ret-
rospect, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 506 (1989).
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seaboard produced Madison, Jefferson and all the rest. They came to the
view that maybe the framers put before themselves somewhat different
questions. They asked questions about what type of government struc-
ture would lead to greater results. I have been trying ever since to figure
out how to tell Roger Porter and the President that that thought is the
last paragraph of a "second-rate" article that I wrote in the George
Washington Law Review.27 I finally came upon the notion that the best
way is to tell the story at some conference and see if it will work its way
back.
In any event, part of my beef with the notion of formalistic jurispru-
dence is that it impoverishes the thinking of lawyers and judges, and it
impoverishes the public debate about how government works and what
history teaches us are the characteristic flaws and weaknesses of particu-
lar governmental designs. The reason I think this impoverishment of
public debate is so important is that the predominant thing about our
Constitution on many of these issues of government structure-and this
is where I agree with Steve Breyer-*is really its lacuna. For most, or
many, of the important questions-I think this is the point that Peter
Strauss made-regarding issues of governmental structure, we find very
little guidance in the words of the Constitution. We are in many ways
building institutions in the holes of the great silence of the Constitution.
So let me turn then to the policy question of whether or not an inter-
agency review process, a unitary executive subjecting the decisions to the
views and opinions of others, can be defended not only on grounds of
constitutional theory, but also on more practical grounds of good govern-
ment and political theory. I think the answer to that question is clearly
"Yes." I think that the governmental decisions that emerge as a result of
the review process, which takes place within a unitary executive, are
much better decisions, much wiser decisions, than they would be if we
had the strong theory of agency autonomy. To be more specific, I think
the decisions that are reached in the environmental area are sounder,
better, wiser, and more balanced decisions, and create better government
because the results the EPA might reach if left to its own under a strong
autonomy view are hammered out and tempered by the very agency re-
views and the unitary executive process within the executive branch.
What is important about this, I suppose, is not only that I think that
based on my very limited tenure at EPA, but that Bill Riley thinks that
27. See supra note 26.
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too. He said so the other day in a meeting, and he thinks as a result of
the OMB review process, we probably come to better decisions than we
would without it.
I think the explanation, at least in my view, is set out in a very impor-
tant article by Cutler and Johnson, which was published in the Yale Law
Journal in 1975, called "Regulation and the Political Process."28 I rec-
ommend it to anyone who is interested in this area. It is a very impor-
tant article for two reasons: One, I think it gives us a very valuable
historical perspective on the difference between today's governmental
structure with the OMB process playing such a major role, from what
people perceived it to be as recently as fifteen years ago in 1975. In that
article, Cutler and Johnson argue strongly that we need to consider
whether and how to create a system for continuous political monitoring
of all government regulation. They have a specific proposal for how to
do that, which would basically give the President authority to break off
the various goals of single-mission agencies. Now they made one mis-
take: they built into their proposal a legislative veto-apologies to my
friend, Ted Olson. Other than that, I think the article wears remarkably
well.
I think one of the reasons why we need a unitary executive is because
almost all agencies have a single-mindedness of purpose about its goals
and values. A natural process of self-selection takes place in government.
Those people who tend to work for the Environmental Protection
Agency tend to be people who think environmental values are very im-
portant. They probably, by definition, think environmental values are
more important than the population of the United States generally does
or they would not have chosen to make that their life's work. So, of
course, we believe environmental values probably should trump most
other values. At least many people believe that. I cannot say I believe
that, but I probably believe they are more important than many other
people do.
In the interagency review process, we and every other agency are re-
quired to justify our decisions in a process of debate, dialogue, and
weighing and balancing against other competing goals and values. The
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy comes in and forces
us to listen and pay attention to what the consequences of our actions
will be for the other important goals and values of our society and our
28. Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395 (1975).
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political process. I think it is unfortunate that many of my colleagues
who are very much in favor of liberal dialogue and debate-a very popu-
lar theme in the Academy these days-do not recognize that the unitary
executive theory and the 0MB and Justice Department reviewing roles
really bring that same need for dialogue among people with competing
values. The process is about the harmonization of your values with an-
other person's values through dialogue.
I think the major shortcoming in the process, at least as I have exper-
ienced to date, is that it is awfully cumbersome. It is not as speedy as
perhaps it might be. I think as this process develops further, it is likely
that we will try to make the process not delay things as much as it does
now. Right now, you are not only talking about OMB and the Justice
Department, and a lot of other individual agencies, but there really can
be a very, very long process of interagency review and comment.
The thought I would like to leave with you in closing is that the OMB
process, with its reliance on cost-effective analysis, is often misunder-
stood by my students, particularly in environmental law, because it com-
pares the benefits of a particular program, such as the environmental
benefits of something we would like to do, with the cost of doing so.
Students, as Frank Easterbrook knows, or Steve Breyer knows, or Steve
Carter knows, are very fond of saying, "Well, yeah, but environmental
values-it is just money on the other side!" What people often miss is
that the money on the other side is a way of measuring all the other
things we can do with those resources. Therefore, in some sense, the
money, the cost-benefit process, is a way of trading off our environmental
values against all the other competing values that society might pursue.
In closing, I would just like to say I think the unitary executive, inter-
agency review, and so on, is really, in an interesting way, a kind of micro-
cosm of the framers' general vision of separation of powers in
government. That is to say, those who wish to use the power of govern-
ment to pursue their particular goals and objectives are required to run a
virtual gauntlet of other institutions with competing values. So if some-
thing is to be done using the power of the federal government, then it has
to pass through a number of checks and be approved from a number of
different perspectives. That strikes me, in the long run, not only as being
constitutionally required, but as resulting in much better and wiser gov-
ernment decisions.
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TERRY EASTLAND*
I remember when I came to Washington in 1983 and joined the Justice
Department-it was March of '83. Something happened the first week I
was here that educated me on the nature of the modern state. Ted Olson,
I am sure, remembers this quite well. We were seated around the Attor-
ney General's conference table that morning, reading our newslips
which, by the way, is another way in which the unity of the executive
branch is fractured. We all were reading stories about how the President
and the Attorney General, Bill Smith, somehow had been censoring the
films that were coming in from Canada dealing with acid rain. Of
course, I, being new and naive and just up from some place other than
Washington, thought, of course, the President was responsible, and in
fact he had probably ordered the censorship, and probably through Bill
Smith. I was sure Ted Olson had something to do with it. Of course, it
turned out Bill Smith was stunned. He did not know about it, neither did
Ted Olson, and neither did anyone else. In fact, down in the Criminal
Division, a GS-12 was applying a particular statute, the Foreign Agents
Registration Act. He had a particular job to do: he would see whether
these films from another country comported with current policy, and
then he would act accordingly. So much for the theory, I guess, of the
unitary executive. You know it is not the President or one of his chief
aides that was doing this, but it was just simply the routine nature of
business inside the Justice Department.
I point this out only to make the observation that government is very
large-larger than ever before. This is, as we shall see, one of the reasons
it is difficult to achieve unity in the executive.
I would like to explore this topic less from the narrow focus of agency
rulemaking. Instead, I would like to explore the notion of unity from the
standpoint of The Federalist Papers. The question is, "Why did the fram-
ers think unity in the executive branch important or even necessary?"
The answer has to do with their particular science of politics.
In the eleven essays on the executive branch, all by Alexander Hamil-
ton, we find unity listed as a so-called "ingredient" of something else,
that is to say, of the energy of the executive. The other ingredients are
the following: duration of office, by which Hamilton meant the four-year
term and re-eligibility, which, as we know, has been eliminated; an ade-
* Resident Scholar at the National Legal Center for the Public Interest.
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quate provision for the executive support, which is an adequate salary
and competent powers, which are the constitutional powers listed in arti-
cle II. These ingredients, when brought together in the same mixing
bowl, make executive energy.
In a moment I will come back to the particular ingredient of unity.
But here, I think it is important to focus on what unity, in combination
with these other things, gets you. It gets you energy, which was critical
to the framers' understanding of the new constitutional order. In
number seventy of the Federalist Papers29 Hamilton wrote that energy in
the executive is a leading characteristic of good government. An ener-
getic and independent executive was important for two reasons: one was
administrative, the other political. Both of these reasons were rooted in
the experience of the 1780s-the administrative in the national experi-
ence and the political in the state or colonial experience.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the actual administration of na-
tional government had proven extremely difficult. It was widely recog-
nized that there needed to be some independent entity that could carry
out tasks, that is to say, execute the laws. It was believed only an ener-
getic body could do this. At the same time, experience in the states had
demonstrated something else-that legislatures themselves can threaten
the liberty of the people. There needed to be some way to contain what
John Marshall called "the wild projects of the moment," which seemed
to emanate routinely from legislative bodies. Again, the executive was
needed for this political job. Because the executive, on this understand-
ing, had to act as a force against the legislature, it was made, by defini-
tion, to be energetic. I think Hamilton was smack on when he
understood the veto power as an ingredient of energy.
Energy was the precious commodity in the framers' political science.
Even so, let us note with some care Hamilton's formulation: Energy of
the executive is a-"a," not "the"-leading characteristic of good gov-
ernment.30 Hamilton does not simply equate good government with an
energetic one, and we should be glad that the article he used was "a" and
not "the." Totalitarian governments, after all, can be energetic but they
cannot be called "good."
Again in Federalist Paper Number 70, we come upon the connection
between power and the people who grant the power. Good government
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (A. Hamilton).
30. Id.
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is government accountable to the people. It has no power other than that
granted to it by the people. Energy and a "due responsibility" in the
executive, as Hamilton also insisted upon, are together the leading char-
acteristics of good government.31
With this much of the framers' political science sketched, I would like
to return to the matter of unity. Should the executive be a unity or a
plurality-one person or a council of many? Hamilton explains why the
Convention's choice of unity is superior to the alternative, plurality. I
think it is a measure of the successful choice that we have forgotten
much of this whole argument. It was about both energy and accountabil-
ity. Indeed, in discussing the pardon power, it is clear that it is not only
speed and vigor that the executive has to have, but also the ability to
deliberate. Hamilton in a later paper, not in the Federalist Papers,
equates energy ultimately with wisdom.
So much for the theory. Today the executive department is obviously
much, much bigger than at the founding. I am intrigued to note that
Washington reviewed all of the correspondence going out of the execu-
tive department. No President could do that today. The President needs
aides-lots of them. But the larger the executive department gets, the
more likely it is that the executive will be less unitary. This is so, I think,
regardless of the growth of congressional staff, the subcommittees, or
other external developments. It is so in large part because of human
nature. And the less unitary the executive becomes because of expan-
sion, the less energetic the President becomes in the administration of the
government.
One good argument for a smaller central government is that it may
produce a natural tendency towards unity. A nonofficial, political cul-
ture tends to pull the executive office apart. The many interest groups,
which collect in Washington and are a part of this culture, strive to hold
the executive branch captive. Bill Bennett tells the story of his arrival at
the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). He was told by a
staffer that the "groups" were ready to meet with him. The invitation
was refused, but the "groups" went ahead and met. The Washington
presence of these "groups" is difficult for most executive appointees to
ignore; it is easy to pay attention to what they say. One reason is that
appointees tend not to know that much about what they are doing. And
precisely because government is so large and there are so many political
31. Id.
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appointees, the President is hard-pressed, especially early on in the ad-
ministration, to provide specific guidance. Consider that Bennett and
his colleagues at NEH never received any guidance from the White
House as to what their agenda should be. They had no guidance. They
had to hope to perform their tasks in the way that the President wanted.
In other words, they had to hope that their eyes, arms, ears, and hands
would perform as the President wanted.
Finally, I will just note three other things that work against unity.
One is the national news media. Second is criminal, unethical or unwise
behavior, by political appointees. The third is a special prosecutor cul-
ture that encourages specious charges of wrong doing.
How does a President overcome all these forces that work against
unity? We can blame Congress. We can blame the media and other
forces. But, the Executive himself needs to be energetic if he hopes to
preserve his unity and his energy.
DISCUSSION
BREYER: I am trying to think of an example to make my point about
"centralized" v. "bulkanized" decision making. It is hard to think about
it in totally abstract terms, which would be useless. It is easier to think
about it in terms of particular policy decisions. For example, I do not
think it is a good idea to have a "unitary executive" if that means central-
ized decision making in the White House about whom to prosecute crim-
inally. I would have second thoughts about the President himself
deciding who should receive radio and television licenses. Consider all
the issues of the day. I personally think there is a need for a centraliza-
tion of environmental policy, which in my view would bring about a
more effective policy, more bang for the buck. And I think regulations of
safety and health risks will require greater centralization and coordina-
tion. But, to decide proper government structure one must decide irre-
spective of each individual kind of policy decision; one cannot have a
different structure for each different kind of policy. And that kind of
more abstract general decision about structure is difficult to make.
My second point is that there are general reasons, politically speaking,
for giving more centralized control in many areas of regulatory decision
making. One of them is the need to relieve the individual agencies from
the political pressures brought by specialized constituencies. Of course,
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the President is not immune from political pressures. I remember a story
about someone who once worked for a President years ago. The Presi-
dent was sitting in his office and asked his assistant, "Which airline
should get the route?" The assistant wrote a little memo saying, "Mr.
President, there's Airline A and Airline B. Airline A gave us a lot of
money in the campaign." The President was furious. He ran out and
said, "Never write a memo like that again! Come in and tell me." I
mean, Presidents are not immune from politics.
We do know this, however, the political pressures upon the President
are more general in nature. The President alone is a politically responsi-
ble official, because he is an elected official. He is paid to consider poli-
tics. That fact cuts a bit, generally speaking, in favor of the White House
becoming the focus of political pressures. Note, however, that the polit-
ical and substantive considerations change over time and the desirable
focus of pressures and decision making may also change. It is not sur-
prising that the constitutional separation of powers doctrine is liberal
enough, by and large, to keep the courts from having a single structure.
Indeed, Congress says that under the Constitution civil servants can be
treated like judges. Congress can give adjudicatory officials like
Humphrey of the FTC and Wiener special protection from dismissal.
Congress can even give a special prosecutor special protection. I doubt
that Congress could tell the President he cannot fire the Secretary of
State, however. Rather the Constitution gives the government leeway-
not absolute, but a lot of leeway-in terms of proper structure. That is,
in part, because political considerations as well as substance are relevant
to "proper" structure, and these considerations change over time.
SILBERMAN: Well, first, I should hasten to say that I have not re-
ferred to Professor Elliott's article as a second-rate article. Actually, I
thought some of the other articles printed along with it suffered by com-
parison. I did think there was something tenuous about his argument,
which, I expect, will stiffen after he spends a few years in the executive
branch. I would not be surprised if then he sounded a little bit more like
his colleague, Professor Carter. One point Steve Breyer mentioned in his
opening talk, and alluded to again, is a very interesting question. He said
that Congress does not delegate the interpretation or application of laws
to the President, but rather to his subordinates. It is a very interesting
proposition, although, I have to confess that I did write an opinion re-
jecting it. I suggested that the President has the power under a broad
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range of circumstances to oversee directly his subordinates' interpreta-
tion and application of the laws.
Wiener,32 which is a quasi-judicial situation, is quite different. It is
different because it is quasi-judicial, and therefore, not policy making.
The same thing is true, as I discussed in the Morrison opinion, with re-
spect to limitations on the President's power to discharge civil servants.
No theoretical civil servant prior to Morrison who is making policy, or
who works for an individual somewhere along the line who makes policy,
was thought not to be subject to removal by the President.
One other point which I alluded to in my talk, which I come back to
and which cannot be said too often: If one only thinks of separation of
powers as a management principle for organizing the government, a
structure of organizing government, one is more inclined to appreciate
Steve Breyer's approach; "Hey, the Court should not get involved. This
is just a question of how boxes are organized. Unless it really offends
something blatant in the Constitution, let's not take the trouble." That,
in my view, totally ignores that separation of powers is designed to pro-
tect the American people against too much accretion of government.
Even if a President, the Congress, and the judiciary together decide they
will obliterate separation-of-power limitations, it is constitutionally ob-
jectionable because it impacts on the American citizens. Nowhere is that
more clear, in my judgment, than when it involves the unconstitutional
prosecution of citizens.
ELLIOTT7: Because I am no longer in the academic business, I begin to
realize that the equivalent of a tour to promote your book, for which you
go on talk shows, is to come to conferences to talk about your articles, so
that people can encourage other people to read them. So I do not care
how this article gets rated, as long as people spell the citation correctly.
In my prepared parts, I tried to resist the temptation to discuss cases
with the two judicial members of the panel. That proves to be an irresis-
tible temptation for law professors. But since I was arguing about the
over-judicialization and over-literalization of our political dialogue and
conference issues, it seems to me that I ought not, in my own words, to
fall prey to the tendency for which I myself was criticized. However,
now I cannot resist.
I think I disagree with Steve Breyer's prediction that the Mistretta sen-
32. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1948).
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tencing commission case33 necessarily represents the future of our sepa-
ration-of-powers jurisprudence, as opposed to Bowsher.34 In the
literature, people, I think Peter Strauss coined this phrase, are talking
about two tendencies: functionalism and formalism in our separation-of-
powers jurisprudence. I do not like the terms much. I agree that formal-
ism is not really the right word. One of the problems we always face in
legal academics is if we do not use the same words that are already estab-
lished, if we all invent our own private language, then we do not have any
type of cumulative effect.
Anyway, I do not think formalism is politically the right word. In any
event, I think these two tendencies, which I think are reflected alter-
nately in the Supreme Court's opinions, are both generated by the same
fixation on literalism as the jurisprudential underpinnings for separation-
of-powers jurisprudence-which is why I say that separation-of-powers
jurisprudence is invisible. Not that the results are wrong, but that we
failed to really develop over time a cumulative wisdom in the separation-
of-powers or through the judicial process. There I disagree with Judge
Silberman. I think that the primary contrast is with something like the
first amendment. I think that we have constructed incredible intellectual
edifices under the first amendment. They may be right, or they may be
wrong, but it is not formalistic. Whatever it is, there is a tremendous
body of lore there; I do not see similar creativity in the judicial elabora-
tion of separation-of-powers principles.
With that point, let me just remark very quickly on the point about
Morrison v. Olson.3 5 With all due respect to Ed, I think it is a pretty
good opinion, but it is not popular here. One of the reasons I think it is a
good opinion is because the Court begins to get beyond particular results,
and addresses some of the structural and conceptual issues concerning
how the framework of governmental design should be made to work bet-
ter. My response to Judge Silberman is that in the hypothetical that he
put forward about the independent prosecutor in the times of McCarthy-
ism, the substantive policy of prosecuting people for McCarthyite rea-
sons would be wrong, but not necessarily the constitutional structure of
creating an independent prosecutor.
33. United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
34. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
35. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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EASTLAND: What I would like to do is pick up on one of Elliott's
comments regarding the tendency of legalism to impoverish our public
debate. I want to take that point in a slightly different direction. I think
there is a reason Presidents do not tend to invest their time in agency
rulemaking and other related issues. I am not saying this is good or bad,
but I want to describe the reason.
The reason is that the President also has political responsibilities. A
President has come to be expected, certainly in the age since Woodrow
Wilson, to be a rhetorical President. Ronald Reagan performed accord-
ing to form, according to expectations. During his first year in office, on
February 18th, he came out with a large, substantial, ambitious economic
recovery program-the national economy having become one of the
President's chief responsibilities in recent decades. He went on national
television to speak and get legislative votes. We all know the history of
that. That was the rhetorical Presidency in action. Notice the bang for
the buck you get as the President. You can get a victory, a tangible
victory, understood by the voting public.
George Bush, here in the ninth year of the Reagan-Bush Administra-
tion is, I think, a very interesting, almost nineteenth-century President.
He is not the rhetorical President. He does not give speeches; he hates
speeches. He has given two speeches on national television. Neither
speech was to push legislation. But he has vetoed ten bills; Reagan ve-
toed just two in the first year of his Presidency. Some of the bills Bush
vetoed were not just policy bills, but they threatened the prerogatives of
the President. This President also has, I think, a keen understanding of
some of those things I was talking about in regard to unity.
I think that it is interesting to observe that, while we may worry about
the degree to which a particular President governs as we might want
him, the President that we have now does seem to be tending to the office
in a way that is remarkable. He has prevented leaks; we have not had the
kind of leaks that you had in the first year of the Reagan Administration.
He also does not have ethics problems with his people. This has helped
his unity, and it has helped him have energy in the areas in which he
wants to have energy.
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
QUESTION. I would like Professor Silberman to comment on such pecu-
liarities as the fact that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), allegedly
has been given the power to file its own briefs before the Supreme Court
without having to receive permission for such filings from the Justice De-
partment. That is just one example of what seems to me, in theory, an
unconstitutional creation ofpower that cannot be checked by the executive.
SILBERMAN: I answer the question without assuming, as your ques-
tion assumes, that the right is unconstitutional. As you may know, there
is a statute giving the FTC authority, which it can easily exercise, to seek
certiorari without the approval of the Solicitor General. It has done so
twice, and twice the Supreme Court has granted certiorari. As the bur-
den of my talk should suggest, going back to United States v. ICC 36 in
which incidentally, to make Terry's point, the government, the Justice
Department, argued in the Supreme Court that they could be adverse to
the ICC because they wanted the short-term advantage out of it; they
wanted to sue as a shipper. In Frankfurter's dissent, he said it was not
justiciable, but he makes Terry's point that often the executive branch
shoots itself in the foot.
Again, my point, my thesis, was that the Supreme Court looks quite
convivially at splitting the executive branch in any kind of litigation fo-
rum because-and I do not mean to put this in too harsh a way, human
nature being what it is-it enhances the judicial power.
BREYER: Well, I think the judiciary has a strong interest in making
certain that there is coordination of legal positions within the executive
branch. There is a governmental interest in coordinating regulatory rules
through a central body which is politically responsible eventually to po-
litically elected officials, such as the President. Legal positions ought to
be coordinated as well. If some particular agency is upset about a partic-
ular Department of Justice position it asks Congress and sometimes ob-
tains an exemption from the requirement of Justice Department
coordination. The result is that a judge may see inconsistent or different
executive branch positions taken by the different executive agencies.
When the case gets to the Supreme Court, the executive begins to coordi-
nate the views of its separate parts. Well, that is a little irritating for a
36. 337 U.S. 426 (1948).
Washington University Open Scholarship
518 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
lower court which may discover the executive reversing field after it de-
cides a case. So, I think the judiciary has a strong institutional interest in
seeing that the executive agencies' legal views are coordinated within the
executive itself.
SILBERMAN: But that is only if you have a certain view of the judici-
ary, which Judge Breyer has.
QUESTION. Judge Silberman, I was delighted to have you raise what I
think is the key question here, and that is the effect of a statute which
purports to vest authority directly in subordinate officials. I would like to
see just how much trouble you are willing to get yourself into.
SILBERMAN: I think I have shown I shall.
QUESTION. Wait until you hear this one. Let us take, for example, the
Tea Importation Act, 37 which tells the Secretary of HHS to promulgate
standards for the purity, fitness for consumption, and quality of tea impor-
tation. Suppose the President is a tea fancier, and one day happens to be
flipping through the C.ER., comes across the nine pages of regulations on
tea standards, and decides they are lousy standards. He writes up his own
set, sends them through whatever the appropriate process is and off they go
to the Federal Register to be printed. Is that a valid regulation?
SILBERMAN: Well, you know better than to expect that I would an-
swer that question, but I will say this: The one silver lining I found in
the majority opinion in Morrison v. Olson was Justice Rehnquist's accept-
ance of the notion, which at several points he explicitly does, that "to
take care that the laws are faithfully executed," is both a duty and source
of authority of the President.38 In that series of law review articles from
George Washington University that Professor Elliott explained piece-by-
piece, there is an article by another person, which suggests, as did my
colleague on the Court of Appeals, Judge Ginsberg, that that clause is
not a grant of authority for the President to ensure any particular inter-
pretation of the laws. I think there is, in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Morrison v. Olson, the suggestion that there is a Presidential duty. Now
how far to go, what he would do, how he would deal with some of the
hypotheticals you raised, and which Judge Breyer raised, I am not pre-
pared to say, since we will probably have it before our court next week.
37. 21 U.S.C. § 43 (1989).
38. 487 U.S. 654, 658 (1988).
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ELLIOTT: I would like to address that issue as well, but not the par-
ticular statutory context you posed. I am not as familiar with the Tea
Act as you are. I am speaking in my capacity as a law professor rather
than as a general counselor of the EPA. What that means is the staff has
not had a chance to brief me on this and tell me I am wrong. We have in
many of our environmental statutes an interesting difference in that most
of our statutes refer to the Administrator, but some of them refer to the
President, and then there is a delegation of power from the President to
the Administrator.
My perception is it makes not one iota of difference. In both instances,
we are subject to the policy guidance and control of the President, as I
believe we should be. I think that the conversation is proceeding on the
assumption that it makes a great deal of difference which word is used in
the statute. I think that is incorrect, as a matter of law, at least in the
environmental area. Granted this issue has never been definitively and
squarely resolved by the Supreme Court. At least in Sierra Club v.
Costle, 39-this is the coal-fired New Source Performance Standard case
in the D.C. Circuit-the argument was pressed quite hard on constitu-
tional grounds by environmental groups. Led by my friend, Bill Buckley,
these groups argued that it was constitutionally impermissible for the
White House staff to "interfere" with the policy deliberations by the
EPA in a statutory context when the statute, the Clean Air Act, confided
the discretion in the Administrator, rather than the President. The D.C.
Circuit, made very short shrift of that argument.
SILBERMAN: That was when Carter was President.
ELLIOTT: That is right. So much for formalism.
EASTLAND: I have just one comment on that. It seems to me that in
this system of separated powers, the President ultimately has to have the
authority, whatever the statute may say. I think I agree with what Don
Elliott just said-how it is written is less important. I do think, though,
that it illustrates a central problem. Every four years in this country, we
have an election. The media devotes a tremendous amount of time and
attention to it. So do the American people, I guess. The popular psy-
chology assumes that we will have a unitary President because only one
President gets elected.
As soon as election day is over, though, we are back in the modem day
39. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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administrative state, and then we are back to a de facto plural executive.
We are back to a notion of accountability that is different from the origi-
nal one-accountability to a Washington political culture.
QUESTION. When you were speaking about the relationship of the courts
and the executive branch, I was thinking about the different Presidencies,
particularly the one of Abraham Lincoln, which probably to this day con-
tinues to be one of the best examples of the need for a strong unitary exec-
utive. My question is how do you evaluate the ancient proposition that one
reason the separation of powers doctrine is less viable today is that the
members of the two nonjudicial branches no longer believe or fully appreci-
ate that they have an independent duty to interpret the Constitution?
SILBERMAN: I am not sure that the right, duty, or authority of mem-
bers of both the executive and legislative branch to interpret the Consti-
tution for themselves, independently or separately from the judiciary,
constitutes a particular reason for tensions over the separation of powers
in the last twenty years. I think it comes more from the competition
between the executive branch and the Congress. In my talk, I suggested
how the judiciary reacts to that.
BREYER: Please remember that the special prosecutor case40 came to
the Supreme Court in the context of a law that had been passed by Con-
gress and signed by the President. Now think of the different attitudes
that judges may have when a case involves a Bill of Rights protection of
fundamental freedom or when the Court is called upon to umpire, under
the separation of powers doctrine, a dispute between the other two
branches of government. Is either present in the special prosecutor
case-a case in which both the President and the Congress have agreed
on the law? Is there not something odd about the President attacking the
law as unconstitutional? His having done so might give rise to the
thought, "If you thought it was unconstitutional, why did you sign it?"
It is not that I totally disagree with you, it is just that I have made an
addition.
SILBERMAN: That is an interesting point, and I gather that the co-
rollary to that, you would have thought, is that Morrison v. Olson should
have been decided the other way had the independent counsel statute
been passed over the President's veto.
40. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1973).
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BREYER: Yes, that is the corollary.
ELLIOTT: As the lone representative of the executive branch, defend-
ing against judicial hegemony and the principle of judiciary iber alles,
which was referred to earlier, let me at least point out that I think there
are very important reasons that the executive branch and probably also
Congress, regard themselves as having an independent duty to abide by
and make judgments about constitutional principles. That is not, I
would suggest, equivalent to defining the law as declared by the Supreme
Court. On the other hand, I think it is important that the executive
branch continues to raise issues for the courts to decide.
It is also very important that the executive branch thinks about these
issues and makes independent judgments about them. I think, at least in
the Reagan-Bush Administration, the executive branch was thinking a
lot about the constitutional issues. I think that where the process has
fallen down, perhaps, is in the Congress. Congress, I think, very seldom
thinks about constitutional issues, or at least seldom debates constitu-
tional issues. They frequently defer to the courts and say, "Well, we will
find out if this is constitutional." I would say, to put in a good word for
formalism, I think one reason that they do that is that we have lost a
tremendous amount of predictability in our constitutional law. So many
of the cases are very particular and limited to their facts and influenced
by political factions. It is very difficult to have an interpretive process
and have a true constitutional law in the absence of a jurisprudence that
is formalistic enough to have theoretical guidance, to argue about theory.
I think separation of power cases are examples of when there is very little
consistent, theoretical guidance and predictability in the Supreme Court
opinions, as opposed to some superior opinions that emanate from some
of the so-called lower courts.
I think we are suffering from an impoverishment of our constitutional
law, which generally makes it very difficult for those outside the judiciary
to participate in these debates. I certainly think the executive branch is
trying very hard to develop some constitutional theory and to think seri-
ously about those issues, and it should be.
EASTLAND: I just want to say I am glad that the President's signa-
ture did not influence you when you were on the bench. I do not think it
should influence any court, but I do think perhaps it might influence a
court. There might be some kind of a psychological impact. This throws
us back on the fact that the President of the United States, in this case
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Ronald Reagan, had two chances to veto the statute. Let us say the Pres-
ident had vetoed the bill in January 1983 instead of signing it. He would
have been in a very good position politically to have done so. He did not
have the investigations of the known people, with the exception of Labor
Secretary Donovan. In 1987, when the statute was re-authorized a sec-
ond time, the politics had worsened for Reagan.
I think that President Bush's political dynamics are much in his favor
at the moment. President Bush might be well positioned simply to say:
"I will not sign any independent counsel re-authorization legislation that
does not apply the law to members of Congress." I think with the experi-
ence of Richard Phelan and the experience now of the Keating Five, the
idea of outside counsel will be less attractive-not that I believe it should
not be applied to Congress or anyone else. But I do think it would work
tactically, perhaps, to get rid of the law.
QUESTION. Judge Breyer, you suggested the hazards of a unitary execu-
tive and named two areas: one, prosecutions, and the other, FCC licenses.
You suggested the possibility or the likelihood of political favoritism, and
vendettas. But then one begins to think of the independent FCC. It was
reported in the first edition of Breyer and Stewart's article that in a twenty-
year period, every license issued had been to a licensed applicant who be-
longed to, and perhaps contributed funds to, the political party of the Pres-
ident in office-that is, with the independent FCC. My question is:
Whether there is any theory or empirical evidence to suggest that both of
these very legitimate fears-political favoritism and vendettas-are more
engendered by splintering or by unification?
BREYER: Institutions are complicated. I will not say the FCC is a
model of perfection. I do think that sometimes "bureaucratizing" a pro-
cess helps provide safeguards of fairness. Such "bureaucratizing"-re-
moving a decision from direct political influence-is appropriate in the
criminal justice process. And it is easier to bureaucratize the less central
Justice Department than it is to bureaucratize the more central White
House. There are other kinds of decisions for which bureaucratizing is
less appropriate. Personally, I think awarding television licenses from
the White House would not work as well as having the FCC award them.
The general point is that there are many different kinds of executive
branch decisions; more are criminal prosecutions, handing out television
licenses, investigations by the Inspector General, and all sorts of adjudi-
catory proceedings. There are hosts of different kinds of tasks. Institu-
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tions having to deal with such differences must themselves come in
different shapes and sizes. There is nothing wrong with saying that one
can have an executive branch made up of sub-institutions of different
shapes and sizes. If we do not like the particular shape or size of some of
those sub-institutions, the appropriate remedy is to call the matter to the
public's attention, explain how the particular sub-institution is working
or not working, and then ask Congress to change the ground rules. I am
wary of "general" institutional solutions for so many different kinds of
problems.
ELLIOTT: I would like to address that briefly. I thought there were
two examples that really worked, not by the anomaly of having the Presi-
dent decide these issues, but rather by smuggling in an inappropriate fac-
tor describing fhe decision that would be equally inappropriate, whether
the President or some other institution was involved. I also think the
example worked, in part, by the oddity of a President of such limited
time getting involved in such small, small issues. So it struck us as
counterintuitive, but I really do not think structurally there was anything
wrong with it.
Having said that, I will raise one countervailing consideration, which I
do not think is compelling. The way we have built the administrative
state against making these decisions based on inappropriate factors is, of
course, judicial review. To the extent the President makes these deci-
sions personally, on inappropriate factors, we are going to be in a situa-
tion of having the Court review these decisions. This makes us a little bit
uncomfortable in a constitutional sense.
SILBERMAN: When I became Deputy Attorney General in 1974, I
found, to my utter astonishment, that every antitrust action brought by
the Justice Department, every single one, of any kind, had to be signed
by either me or the Attorney General. I could not, for the life of me,
understand why.
Tom Kauper was Assistant Attorney General for antitrust at the time,
and I asked him why. He said, "Well, it's always been that way." I
said, "Well, let's check and find out why." It turned out that it was that
way because when Thurman Arnold was Assistant Attorney General,
Roosevelt was President. Thurman Arnold had this quaint habit of su-
ing contributors to the Presidential campaign. As a result, the Attorney
General had to approve every antitrust complaint. We did change that.
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You can not think of a more unitary executive-nor more powerful-
than Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
ELLIOTT: Just to follow up on that, an interesting question is whether
the unitary executive theory would require a political appointee account-
able to the President to sign off on every binding act by the executive
branch.
SILBERMAN: Surely not, no one can bind the EPA.
ELLIOTT: The question I am raising is whether or not it is a conse-
quence of the unitary executive theories that people who are not directly
accountable to the President serve his pleasure. They act in the name of
the executive branch of the United States in a binding way. I do not
know the answer to that question. It strikes me as a difficult and troub-
ling one, and perhaps one that you will-write an elucidating opinion
about.
EASTLAND: Well, if we are telling stories from the New Deal era,
there is one in which the last Attorney General for Roosevelt fired his
head of the Lands Division because he was prosecuting or was about to
prosecute someone who was a friend of one of Roosevelt's closest aides.
So I guess this kind of coordination of control was not very virtuous.
SILBERMAN: I am not sure we are helping our cause.
EASTLAND: I think it is in the nature of the Executive to sometimes
hide.
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